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Inventory Games∗
ANA MECA1 JUDITH TIMMER2 IGNACIO GARCÍA-JURADO3 PETER BORM4
Abstract
Inventory management studies how a single firm can minimize the average cost per time unit
of its inventory. In this paper we extend this analysis to situations where a collective of firms
minimizes its joint inventory cost by means of cooperation. Depending on the information revealed
by the individual firms, we analyze related cooperative TU games and focus on proportional
division mechanisms to share the joint cost.
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1 Introduction
Generally speaking, shops or firms trade various types of goods, and to keep their service to their
customers at a high level they aim at meeting the demand for all goods on time. To attain this goal,
shops may keep inventories in a private warehouse. These inventories bring costs along with them. To
keep these costs low, a good management of the inventories is needed. The management of inventory,
or inventory management, started at the beginning of this century when manufacturing industries and
engineering grew rapidly. A starting paper on mathematical models of inventory management was
HARRIS (1915). Since then, many books on this subject have been published. For example, HADLEY
and WHITIN (1963), HAX and CANDEA (1984) and TERSINE (1994). The main objective of inventory
management is to minimize the average cost per time unit (in the long run) incurred by the inventory
system, while guaranteeing a pre-specified minimal level of service.
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In this paper we study an extremely simple model of inventory systems. In this so-called basic
inventory model we begin with a single firm that stores a single good. Demand for this good is
continuous over time and occurs at a constant rate. The lead-time of the good is deterministic, and
without loss of generality assumed to be zero. The related inventory cost is assumed to be time-
invariant and there are no constraints on the quantity ordered and stored. The inventory cost consists
of two parts: the ordering cost and the holding cost. The ordering cost, the cost one has to pay each
time an order is placed, is fixed, i.e., it is independent of the quantity ordered. The holding cost reflects
the cost per time unit of storage of the good in a private warehouse and is assumed to be linear in the
quantity stored. As a decision criterion we use the average inventory cost per time unit, so we have to
decide upon an ordering policy that minimizes this cost. This decision criterion is well known in the
literature and in text books. See, for example, WINSTON (1994).
New aspects and features come in when we consider situations with several firms or shops and a
single good. One can think for example of some franchise operators restricted to a single good. Each
of these firms has its own private demand and its own private storage possibilities for the good. There
is a single supplier where all firms place their orders, concerning the good, at the same ordering cost.
By means of placing their orders simultaneously, these firms can reduce their total cost5 compared
to the total cost in the initial situation in which they all order separately, because of the lower total
number of orders. An interesting question is what the optimal ordering policy for a group of agents
will be. Here, another aspect enters. When coordination leads to joint cost savings, how should these
savings be allocated among the firms? This paper provides answers to both questions. In particular,
the last question is addressed by means of cooperative game theory arguments.
To provide adequate answers to the two research questions above, we have to specify the exact
informational structure we want to consider. Both the constant rates of the demand and the holding
cost are assumed to be private information; only the ordering cost, which is the same for all firms,
is public information. To coordinate the ordering policy of the cooperating firms, some revelation
of information is needed6. We will assume first that the only information of a firm that is truthfully
revealed to the other firms is its average number of orders per time unit in case this firm would act
on its own in an optimal way. In fact, we will show that this is the only information one needs to
determine an optimal joint ordering policy. If all information would have been public, we would
arrive at the same optimal policy.
In section 3 we consider this first model and corresponding cooperative inventory cost games.
We propose an allocation rule in which the ordering cost is divided proportionally to the square of
the individual ordering cost. This cost only depends on the ordering cost and the individual average
number of orders per time unit, which is public information. The holding cost component is included
implicitly since this cost can only be computed using private information. It turns out that the
proportional rule leads to a core allocation of the corresponding game that even can be sustained as
5When we write ’cost’ we mean average (inventory) cost per time unit.
6We keep the amount of revealed information between the firms as low as possible since the firms may be competitors on
the consumer market. To establish meaningful cooperation without full disclosure of information some kind of intermediary
will be needed.
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a population monotonic allocation scheme (SPRUMONT (1990)), which is a core allocation supported
by a monotonic scheme of core allocations for all subgames. Furthermore, we give an axiomatic
characterization of this rule on the class of ordering cost games, i.e., games where we forget about the
private holding cost and only consider the ordering cost.
Subsequently, we compare the above results with the results in case all information on demands
and holding cost is revealed within a cooperating group of firms. No strengthening can be obtained,
so there seems no real need for the disclosure of private information if one only focuses on savings
with respect to ordering cost. However, if we have full disclosure of information, no limits to storage
capacities, no transport cost and deterministic transport times, one could also consider coordination
with regard to holding cost. Stocks will be stored in the warehouse of the firm with lowest holding
cost. This kind of situations and the corresponding games are considered in section 4. We show that
these games are not necessarily concave but they are permutationally concave.
Section 2 starts with an analysis of the optimal ordering policy in a multi-firm situation with a
single good and a single supplier of the good. We already described sections 3 and 4. In section 5 we
provide an example that illustrates all the games and allocation rules of sections 3 and 4. Section 6
concludes.
2 The Basic Inventory Model
In the basic inventory model, a single firm has to meet the demand for a single good on time. To attain
this, the firm keeps stock on hand. We assume that the firm owns or rents a warehouse, which has an
unlimited capacity, and there is a single supplier who delivers all orders. The demand for the good is
assumed to be known, constant and equals d units per time unit. The firm is not allowed to run out of
stock. The lead-time, the time between placement of an order and delivery of that order, is assumed
to be deterministic and constant, and without loss of generality equal to zero7.
There are two types of cost involved. First, there is the ordering cost. We assume that this cost
does not depend on the quantity ordered. It includes, for example, telephone charges, delivery costs
and the labour cost incurred in processing the order. Each time the firm places an order to replenish
its stock, it pays a fixed ordering cost a. Second, there is the holding cost; the cost of storing goods.
This cost includes insurance, warehouse rental if the warehouse is not owned by the firm, depreciation
if the warehouse is owned by the firm, light, maintenance and so on. The cost of carrying one good
in stock for one time unit is assumed to be constant and is denoted by the constant h.
Since the demand is deterministic and constant and the lead-time equals zero time units, the firm
that wants to minimize its average cost per time unit, will order the same quantity each time an order
is placed. Also, the size of the on hand inventory when an order is issued, will always be zero,
to minimize the average holding cost, since the order is delivered immediately. The firm wants to
determine how many orders it should place per time unit and how much to order such that its goal, to
7Since the lead-time of an order only determines the actual time of delivery of an order and does not influence the
optimal amount of the good to order, this is not a restrictive assumption.
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minimize the average cost per time unit, is attained. The following analysis follows the lines set out
by HADLEY and WHITIN (1963).
Denote by Q the quantity ordered each time the firm places an order to replenish the stock. The
time between two successive placements of orders is thus Q/d time units. A cycle will be defined
as an interval of time of length Q/d starting at that point in time when an order is placed. During
each cycle, the behaviour of the inventory system is exactly the same. Bym we denote the number of
orders placed per time unit, that is, m = d/Q.
Let us take a look at a single time period of unit length. In this period, the demand for the good
equals d units. The firm wants to meet all demand on time, so if the quantity ordered equals Q, then
the number of orders placed per time unit is d/Q on the average and the average ordering cost per
time unit equals ad/Q. Since an order is placed when the size of the stock equals zero, the average
size of the inventory will be 12(Q+ 0) = Q/2. Then the average holding cost per time unit will be
hQ/2. The average cost of the firm per time unit,AC(Q), equals the sum of the average ordering and








The minimal cost is obtained in Q∗ with AC′(Q∗) = 0 and AC′′(Q∗) > 0. It follows that Q∗ =√
2ad/h. The optimal cycle length is Q∗/d =
√
2a/(dh), the optimal number of orders placed
per time unit, m∗, equals m∗ = d/Q∗ =
√
dh/(2a) and the minimal average cost per time unit is
AC(Q∗) =
√
2adh = 2am∗. Note that in the optimum both the holding and the ordering cost per
time unit equal am∗.
In ann-firms inventory situation, there is a setN = {1, 2, . . . , n} of firms. We denote the demand,
holding cost and order size of firm i ∈ N by di, hi and Qi, respectively. There is a single good and
each firm has its own private storehouse. When these firms cooperate, they minimize their total cost
by placing their orders together as one big order. So, in the optimum, cycle lengths are equal for
all firms. Why? Suppose that we have a situation with two firms and unequal cycle lengths, as in
figure 1. We consider the time interval from t1 up to and including t4. Firm Long is the firm with the
largest cycle length. Its cycle length equals t3 − t1. Firm Short has the smallest cycle length, namely
t2− t1. If both firms decide to cooperate then we see from the figure that they place a joint order at t1
and separate orders at t2, t3 and t4. This makes a total of four orders. Firm Long can reduce the total
cost of the cooperating firms by reducing its cycle length to t2 − t1, the cycle length of firm Short. If
we compare figure 1 to figure 2 we see that the reduction of the cycle length reduces the order-size of
firm Long from QL to Q′L since it is optimal to issue an order when the inventory level equals zero.
Consequently, the average inventory level goes down from QL/2 to Q′L/2 and the holding cost of
firm Long decreases. The reduction of the cycle length also implies that the firms place joint orders at
times t1, t2 and t4 and no order is placed at time t3. The total number of orders has fallen from four
to three, so, the ordering cost will decrease.
From the explanation above, it follows that if the total cost is minimized then the cycle lengths of














t1 t2 t3 t4
0
Q′L  firm Long
 firm Short
Figure 2: Equal cycle lengths.
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The average cost per time unit for the firms in N consists of ordering and holding cost. One order is
placed per cycle, so the average ordering cost per time unit equals ad1/Q1. Since each firm stores its
goods in its own storehouse, the holding cost will be the sum of the individual holding cost. Thus, the











Compare this to the individual average cost per time unit adi/Qi + hiQi/2. To express this cost as a


































Here,mi = di/Q∗i =
√
dihi/(2a) denotes the number of orders that minimizes the cost of firm i. The
minimal average cost equals 2amN . As in the one-firm situation, the ordering and holding cost both
equal amN in the optimum. Also notice that the minimal cost only depends on a, which is assumed
to be public information, and mN , which only depends on allmi. So, to calculate the minimal cost, it
suffices for each firm to reveal its number mi, the optimal number of orders if the firm would operate
on its own. The firms do not have to reveal their private demand or holding cost; we do not need full
disclosure of information. However, the amount of information disclosed may influence the possible
allocation mechanism. In section 3, where each firm only reveals its individual optimal number of
orders mi, we propose an allocation mechanism that allocates the total cost proportionally to the
square of the individual cost. In section 4, where we have full disclosure of information, we could use
the same allocation mechanism as in section 3. But now we have more information available. Each
firm reveals its demand and holding cost, so we might as well design an allocation mechanism that




In this section we consider situations in which each firm only revealsmi, its individualoptimal number
of orders per unit of time. Its private information thus consists of di, hi and Q∗i .
We have seen that when all firms work together, the optimal amount to order equals Q̂i = di/mN





j > mi for all i ∈ N . So, the average inventory level will be lower for each
firm: Q̂i/2 < Q∗i /2. Each firm saves on holding cost. Since the holding cost of each firm is private
information, we cannot consider how to divide total holding cost among the firms. Therefore, we
assume that each firm pays its own holding cost.
The optimal order size Q̂i = di/mN of firm i is private information because of di. To be able to
place a joint order without revealing any private information, there is an intermediary who will place
all orders. Each firm i ∈ N tells this intermediary its optimal order size Q̂i and the intermediary
will place an order of size
∑
i∈N Q̂i. The numbers mi are known by the intermediary but not by
the supplier. Thus the supplier only knows
∑
i∈N Q̂i. Furthermore, the intermediary will not pass
information about one firm to another firm thus ensuring that all private information remains private.
We are only interested in allocations of the optimal ordering cost amN . In short, an ordering cost
situation is described by the 3-tuple 〈N, a, {mi}i∈N〉. If a coalition S of firms cooperates then their





Consequently, one can define the corresponding ordering cost game (N, co) as follows. For all
coalitions S ⊂ N , the cost co(S) equals the cost in (2) and co(∅) = 0. We will consider some
properties of ordering cost games. A cost game (N, c) is concave if for all i ∈ N and for all
S ⊂ T ⊂ N \ {i} we have that c(S ∪ {i})− c(S) ≥ c(T ∪ {i})− c(T ) and it is monotone if for all
S ⊂ T ⊂ N it holds that c(S) ≤ c(T ).
Proposition 1 Let 〈N, a, {mi}i∈N〉 be an ordering cost situationand let (N, co) be the corresponding
ordering cost game. Then the game (N, co) is concave and monotone.




i is increasing in the
number of elements in S and since
√
x is a monotonically increasing and concave function, it follows
immediately that (N, co) is monotone and concave. 2
One of the main issues treated in cooperative game theory is how to divide the benefits from
cooperation if coalition N has formed. One way to share these benefits is according to an allocation






xi = c(N ) and
∑
i∈S




When an element of the core x ∈ C(c) is proposed as a distribution of the total cost c(N ) where firm
i has to pay xi, then a coalition S of firms has to pay at most its own cost since
∑
i∈S xi ≤ c(S). So,
no coalition has an incentive to leave the grand coalitionN . A game is balanced if it has a nonempty
core, see BONDAREVA (1963) and SHAPLEY (1967), and it is called totally balanced if each subgame
(S, c|S) is balanced, where c|S(T ) := c(T ) for all T ⊂ S. Since ordering cost games are concave, it
follows from SHAPLEY (1971) that these games are totally balanced.
Another property of ordering cost games is that a nonnegative multiple of such a game is another





and this describes the value of coalition S in an ordering cost game corresponding to the ordering
cost situation 〈N, a, {λmi}i∈N〉. Such a situation arises for example when all individual demands
and holding costs increase by the factor λ. Hence, (N, λco) is an ordering cost game. Nevertheless,
the sum of two ordering cost games (N, co) and (N, c′o), (N, co + c
′
o), does not have to be another
ordering cost game. For example, take N = {1, 2}, a = 2, m1 = 1, m2 = 2, a′ = 5, m′1 = 2,
m′2 = 3. Let the game (N, co) correspond to the ordering cost situation 〈N, a, {mi}i∈N〉 and (N, c
′
o)
to 〈N, a′, {m′i}i∈N〉. Then co({1}) = 2, co({2}) = 4, co(N ) = 2
√
5, c′o({1}) = 10, c
′
o({2}) = 15
and c′o(N ) = 5
√
13. If we sum these games we get (co + c′o)({1}) = 12, (co + c
′
o)({2}) = 19




13. Suppose that we can find values for a′′, m′′1 and m
′′
2 such that
〈N, a′′, {m′′i }i∈N〉 is the ordering cost situation corresponding to the game (N, co + c
′
o). Then the
following equations should hold.
a′′m′′1 = (co + c
′
o)({1}) = 12 (3)
a′′m′′2 = (co + c
′





2 = (co + c
′





From (3) it follows that m′′1 = 12/a
′′ and from (4) m′′2 = 19/a

















144 + 361 =
√
505




13 (though very close). We conclude that (N, co + c′o) is not an
ordering cost game.
Ordering cost games are a special kind of production games, as introduced by SHAPLEY and
SHUBIK (1967). A production game is a cooperative game with player set N and the value of a
coalitionS of players equals g(b(S)) with g a (concave) production function and b(S) =
∑
i∈S b({i})
the resources owned by coalition S. To specify an ordering cost game we set co(S) = g(b(S)) with
g(x) = a
√




i . If each unit of production costs $1 then g(b(S)) not only denotes
how much is produced by coalitionS but it also denotes the cost of these produced goods. The amount
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of resources held by firm i equals b({i}) = m2i . An interesting solution concept for these games is
the proportional rule. We will define the proportional rule π(co) as the rule that divides the total cost















where the last equality follows from (2) for S = N . Another interpretation of this proportional rule
follows from the fact that co({i}) = ami for all firms i. If we decide to divide the total cost co(N )















so we end up with the same proportional rule. This rule has some nice properties.
First, for all ordering cost games (N, co) it holds that π(co) is an element of the core C(co). This
is easy to see. From (6) it follows that
∑





















Second, this proportional rule can be reached through a population monotonic allocation scheme,
in short, a PMAS. These schemes were introduced in SPRUMONT (1990) and defined as follows. A
vector y = {yiS}, i ∈ S, S ⊂ N , S 6= ∅, is a population monotonic allocation scheme of the
cost game (N, c) if and only if it satisfies the following two conditions. Firstly, it should hold that∑
i∈S yiS = c(S) for all nonempty coalitions S of N . Secondly, for all nonempty coalitions S and T
of N and for all i ∈ S it should hold that S ⊂ T implies yiS ≥ yiT . Also from SPRUMONT (1990) it
follows that, since each ordering cost game (N, co) is concave and since π(co) ∈ C(co), there exists
a PMAS y = {yiS}, i ∈ S, S ⊂ N , S 6= ∅ of the game (N, co) such that yiN = πi(co) for all i ∈ N .

































Finally, we see that yiN = πi(co) for all i ∈ N . So, the rule π(c0) can be reached through the PMAS
y.
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We will now introduce a monotonicity property for solution rules on the class of ordering cost
games, which resembles strong monotonicity as defined by YOUNG (1985). Let f be a solution rule on
the class of ordering cost games. Then fi(co) ∈ IR denotes the cost allocated to player i ∈ N according
to this rule in the game co and f(co) = (fi(co))i∈N ∈ IRN . Let (N, co) and (N, c̄o) be ordering cost
games. The rule f satisfies efficiency if
∑
i∈N fi(co) = co(N ) and it satisfies monotonicity if for all
i ∈ N such that co({i}) ≥ c̄o({i}) it holds that co(N )fi(co) ≥ c̄o(N )fi(c̄o).
This monotonicity property starts from the following assumption: ”if co({i}) ≥ c̄o({i}) and
co(N ) = c̄o(N ) then fi(co) ≥ fi(c̄o)”. That is, if we have two inventory situations with the same
total cost to share and a player generates more cost on his own in one situation than in the other, then
he should pay more in the former than in the latter situation. This assumption is equivalent to: if
co({i}) ≥ c̄o({i}) and co(N ) = c̄o(N ) then co(N )fi(co) ≥ c̄o(N )fi(c̄o). However, we want to go
even further. If co({i}) ≥ c̄o({i}) and co(N ) 6= c̄o(N ) then we demand that the above inequality also
holds and so fi(co) has to be greater than fi(c̄o) except for a correction with respect to the cost due to
the other players.
Together with efficiency, monotonicity characterizes the proportional rule on the class of ordering
cost games, as the next theorem shows.
Theorem 1 There exists a unique rule on the class of ordering cost games satisfying efficiency and
monotonicity. It is the proportional rule.
Proof. It is clear that the proportional rule satisfies efficiency and monotonicity.
To show the converse, we take a rule f on the class of ordering cost games that satisfies efficiency














Define the ordering cost game (N, c0o) by c
0
o(S) = 0 for all S ⊂ N . Take an ordering cost game
(N, co). If for some i ∈ N it holds that co({i}) = 0 then co({i}) = c0o({i}). From (7) it follows that




o) = 0 and thus
if co({i}) = 0 then fi(co) = 0. (8)
Define the number I(co) to be the number of players i ∈ N with co({i}) > 0. We show that
fi(co) = πi(co) for all i ∈ N by induction on I(co).
If I(co) = 0 then by (8), fi(co) = 0 for all i ∈ N .
If I(co) = 1 then there is a single player k ∈ N with co({k}) > 0. For all i ∈ N \{k} co({i}) = 0,





i6=k πi(co) = πk(co).
Assume now that f(co) = π(co) for all ordering cost games (N, co) with I(co) ≤ I , I ≤ n− 1.
Consider an ordering cost game (N, c̄o) corresponding to 〈N, ā, {m̄i}i∈N〉 with I(c̄o) = I + 1.
Without loss of generality assume that co({i}) > 0 for the players i = 1, 2, . . . , I + 1. Define the
game (N, co) to be corresponding to 〈N, a, {mi}i∈N〉where a = ā,mj = m̄j for all j ∈ N \ {I+ 1}
10
and mI+1 = 0. Then I(co) = I and f(co) = π(co). Since co({k}) = c̄o({k}) > 0 for all









o({k})/co(N ), so using induction
c̄o(N )fk(c̄o) = co(N )πk(co) = co(N )
c2o({k})
co(N )
= c2o({k}) = c̄
2
o({k}).
From this it follows that fk(c̄o) = c̄2o({k})/c̄o(N ) = πk(c̄o). We also have co({j}) = c̄o({j}) = 0
for all j = I + 2, . . . , n− 1, n so by (8) fj(co) = 0 = πj(co). Finally, efficiency implies that
fI+1(c̄o) = c̄o(N )−
∑
k 6=I+1




which concludes the proof. 2





i , since the holding cost equals the ordering cost in the optimum. We define the
corresponding inventory cost game (N, cv) to be the game with the cost of coalition S equal to the




i and cv(∅) = 0. Thus, cv = 2co.
The properties for ordering cost games also hold for inventory cost games, so these games are concave.
Furthermore, based on the proportional rule for the ordering cost game, we can find a core allocation
of the inventory cost game.
In the ordering cost game, the proportional rule divides the total ordering cost of the grand coalition
among the players. In an inventory cost game, we have to divide ordering and holding cost. Define
the distribution rule r(cv) as follows. Firm i has to pay its part of the ordering cost according to
the proportional rule and its private holding cost, so that ri(cv) = πi(co) + hiQ̂i/2, where Q̂i is the
optimal order size for firm i when he cooperates with all the other firms.
Theorem 2 If (N, cv) is an inventory cost game, then r(cv) ∈ C(cv) and r(cv) can be reached
through a PMAS.
Proof. Let (N, cv) be an inventory cost game. First, we show that πi(co) = hiQ̂i/2. If we solve the


































for all i ∈ N , where the last equality follows from (6). Next, we show that r(cv) is an element of the






πi(co) = 2co(N ) = cv(N )
11





πi(co) ≤ 2co(S) = cv(S).
Hence, r(cv) ∈ C(cv).
Just as in the case of ordering cost games, we can show that the rule r(cv) can be reached through
the PMAS 2y where y is defined as before. 2
What would happen to these results if we had full disclosure of information, i.e., if each firm
would reveal its demand and holding cost? Nothing. This is not very surprising since knowing other
firm’s di and hi is not valuable for determining the optimal order quantity. The value of each coalition
remains unchanged. What does change is that Q∗i and Q̂i become public information for all i ∈ N .
Furthermore, it is possible to define rules to divide the cost of the grand coalition based on this new
information. For example, one could think of a division rule based on the demand di of each firm i.
4 Ordering and Holding Cost
In this section we will consider situations in which there is full disclosure of information. Each firm
i ∈ N reveals its demand di, holding cost hi, its individual optimal number of orders mi and its
individual optimal order size Q∗i . If we assume that there are no limits to storage capacities, transport
cost equal to zero and deterministic transport times, then we can consider coordination with regard to
holding cost. If a member of a coalition has a very low holding cost, then this coalition can reduce its
cost if it stores its inventory in the storehouse of this member.
The average cost per time unit for a coalitionS of firms consists of ordering and holding cost. Just
as before, the total cost is minimized if all cycle lengths are equal, so it should hold thatQi/di = Qj/dj
for all i, j ∈ S. Without loss of generality we assume that firm 1 is a member of coalitionS. Now we
can express Qi as a function of Q1 for all i ∈ S: Qi = diQ1/d1. In each cycle the coalition places
one joint order at cost a, so the average ordering cost per time unit equals ad1/Q1. All goods will be
stored in the warehouse of the firm with lowest holding cost. Define hS := mini∈S hi. The average
inventory level of firm i ∈ S equalsQi/2 per time unit and hSQi/2 denotes the average holding cost












































A holding cost situation is described by the tuple 〈N, a, {hi, di}i∈N〉. Given a holding cost situation
we can define the corresponding holding cost game (N, ch) as the game that assigns to coalition
S ⊂ N its minimal cost as in (9) and ch(∅) = 0. These games are subadditive, i.e., for all coalitions
S and T in N such that S ∩ T = ∅ it holds that ch(S) + ch(T ) ≥ ch(S ∪ T ), but not necessarily
concave, as the following example shows.
Example 1 Consider the holding cost situation with player set N = {1, 2, 3}, a = 0.5, holding cost
h1 = 10, h2 = 10, h3 = 30 and demand equal to 1 for each player. Then











So, this holding cost game is not concave. 2
As in the case of ordering cost games, we can define a proportional rule to allocate the cost of the
grand coalition. The rule p(ch) divides the cost of the grand coalition proportionally to the demands.












Theorem 3 Let 〈N, a, {hi, di}i∈N〉 be a holding cost situation. Then the proportional rule p(ch) is
a core-allocation of the corresponding holding cost game and can be reached through a PMAS y.
Proof. By definition of the proportional rule p(ch) it holds that
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Hence, p(ch) ∈ C(ch). Similar to the proof in the previous paragraph we can define a PMAS y such
that yiN = pi(ch) for all i ∈ N . 2
If a cost game is concave, then it follows from SHAPLEY (1971) that all its marginal vectors belong
to the core. Since holding cost games are not necessarily concave, there may be marginal vectors
that lie outside the core. However, we will show that holding cost games are permutationally concave
games from which it follows that there is at least one marginal vector in the core.
Permutationally concave games were introduced in GRANOT and HUBERMAN (1982) and studied
in DRIESSEN (1988) from which the following definitions are taken. Let Π(N ) denote the set of all
permutations of the player set N. For all σ ∈ Π(N ), σ(i) denotes the position of player i ∈ N in
the ordering σ. Let Pσi be the set of players who precede player i with respect to the ordering σ.
Further, the set P̄σi is obtained from P
σ
i by adding player i. Thus, P
σ
i = {j ∈ N | σ(j) < σ(i)} and
P̄σi = {j ∈ N | σ(j)≤ σ(i)} = P
σ
i ∪ {i}. Define for all σ ∈ Π(N ), σ(0) = 0 and P
σ
0 = ∅.









for all i, j ∈ N ∪ {0} and all R ⊂ N such that σ(i) ≤ σ(j) and R ⊂ N \ P̄σj . A game is said to be
permutationally concave if there exists an ordering σ ∈ Π(N ) such that the game is permutationally
concave with respect to the ordering σ. The marginal vector xσ(c) ∈ IRN with respect to the
ordering σ in the cost game (N, c) is given by xσi (c) = c(P̄
σ
i ) − c(P
σ
i ) for all i ∈ N . GRANOT
and HUBERMAN (1982) showed that if the game (N, c) is permutationally concave with respect to
the ordering σ ∈ Π(N ) then xσ(c) ∈ C(c). If we show that holding cost games are permutationally
concave then it follows from this result that there is at least one marginal vector in the core.
Theorem 4 Holding cost games are permutationally concave games.
Proof. Let (N, ch) be a holding cost game. Without loss of generality we number all players from
1 to n, N = {1, 2, . . . , n}, in such a way that the holding cost per time unit of all players forms a
non-decreasing sequence, i.e., h1 ≤ h2 ≤ . . . ≤ hn. Take σ ∈ Π(N ) such that σ(i) = i for all i ∈ N .
We show that (N, ch) is permutationally concave with respect to this ordering and thus that (N, ch) is
permutationally concave.
Let i, j ∈ N ∪{0}, σ(i) ≤ σ(j) andR ⊂ N \P̄σj . Then i ≤ j since σ(k) = k for all k ∈ N∪{0}.
The game (N, c̄) where c̄(S) =
√∑
j∈S dj for all S ⊂ N , is a concave game (cf. proposition 1), that
is,
c̄(S ∪ U)− c̄(S) ≥ c̄(T ∪ U)− c̄(T )
for all S ⊂ T ⊂ N and for all U ⊂ N \ T . Take S = P̄σi , T = P̄
σ
j and U = R. Then it holds that













We have to show that ch(P̄σi ∪R)− ch(P̄
σ




j ). We distinguish three cases. If
i = 0 and j = 0 then P̄σi = P̄
σ










If i = 0 and j > 0 then P̄σi = ∅ and P̄
σ
j = {1, 2, . . . , j}. Since 1 ∈ P̄
σ
j and 1 /∈ R it holds that
hP̄σj
= hP̄σj ∪R




















and this is equal to ch(R)− ch(∅) ≥ ch(P̄σj ∪ R)− ch(P̄
σ
j ).
Finally, if 0 < i ≤ j then 1 ∈ P̄σi and 1 ∈ P̄
σ
j so hP̄σi = hP̄σi ∪R = hP̄σj = hP̄σj ∪R = h1.














which is ch(P̄σi ∪R)− ch(P̄
σ





This shows that condition (10) is satisfied. 2
5 An Example
In this example, we consider three airline companies, Line1, Line2, and Line3 (in short: 1, 2 and 3),
which operate in the same country. Airplanes can suffer from small defects that need repair. Each
airline company would like to see that its airplanes are repaired as soon as possible so that no flights
have to be canceled. To attain this goal, each airline company owns a warehouse in which it stores
all the things their repairmen may need. One of the items stored in these warehouses are taillights.
Over time, each firm has learned how much taillights are used on the average by the repairmen in a
year. Line1 needs 500 taillights per year, Line2 300 and Line3 400 taillights per year. The holding
cost to store one light for one year is, respectively, 9.6, 11 and 10 dollars. The individual demand and
holding cost are private information. The cost of placing an order for taillights equals $600. We can
model this situation as an inventory situation.
If the airline companies work on their own, then Line1 will order Q∗1 =
√
2ad1/h1 = 250
taillights per cycle of length Q∗1/d1 = 0.5 years and place m1 = d1/Q
∗
1 = 2 orders per year. Its
annual cost equals $2400.00. Note that most numbers in this section are approximations. Line2 will
order Q∗2 = 180.9 taillights per cycle of length 0.61 years and it places m2 = 1.66 orders per year.
Its annual cost equals $1989.98. Finally, Line3 will order Q∗3 = 219.1 taillights per cycle of length
15
0.55 years, so it places m3 = 1.83 orders per year and its annual cost equals $2190.89. The cost of
the various coalitions in the inventory cost game equals (in dollars)
cv({1}) = 2400.00 cv({1, 2}) = 3117.69 cv({1, 2, 3}) = 3810.51
cv({2}) = 1989.98 cv({1, 3}) = 3249.62
cv({3}) = 2190.89 cv({2, 3}) = 2959.73
In case all airline companies work together, the cycle length equals 0.32 years, which is shorter than
any individual optimal cycle length. The cost for a coalition in the ordering cost game is half its cost
in the inventory cost game. The rule r(cv) assigns the total cost cv(N ) proportionally to the square of
the individual cost, so it assigns the cost $(1511.61,1039.23,1259.67) to the airlines. This allocation
lies in the core of the inventory cost game. The proportional rule in the ordering cost game assigns
half of this cost to the airlines. Again, this results in a core-allocation. If there is full disclosure
of information, then the values above will not change. All calculations are based on the individual
optimal number of times to place an order, mi, for all firms i in N . These mi depend on the demand
and holding cost of the corresponding firm since mi =
√
dihi/(2a).
If we include coordination with respect to holding cost, then we see that Line1 owns a very
attractive warehouse, since its holding cost is the lowest. The holding cost game (N, ch) looks as
follows:
ch({1}) = 2400.00 ch({1, 2}) = 3035.79 ch({1, 2, 3}) = 3718.06
ch({2}) = 1989.98 ch({1, 3}) = 3219.94
ch({3}) = 2190.89 ch({2, 3}) = 2898.28
The rule which assigns ch(N ) proportionally to the demands, assigns $(1549.19, 929.52, 1239.36)
to the airlines. Line2 pays the smallest amount since its demand is smallest. The marginal vector x,
which results in a core-element, corresponds to Line1 entering first, then Line3 and finally, Line2.
So, x = $(2400, 498.13, 819.94). Notice that although all firms store their goods in the warehouse of
Line1, this firm has to pay the greatest part of the total cost. This is caused by the fact that x1 = c({1})
and xi ≤ c({i}) for all i 6= 1.
6 Concluding Remarks
The model introduced in the second paragraph is called the basic inventory model since it forms
the basis for a wide variety of inventory models. The basic inventory model is a simple model and
extensions would make the model more realistic. Some possible extensions are a purchasing cost per
unit of the good, a stochastic lead time, a finite supply rate for the ordered goods, individual ordering
cost, allowing for stockouts, quantity discounts and non-constant demand. We will shortly discuss
some of these extensions.
A purchasing cost c per unit of the good implies that next to the fixed cost per order firms also
have to pay the variable cost cQ per order of Q units. Per time unit this implies an extra cost of
16
cQ · d/Q = cd, a constant cost. Since this extra cost is a constant, it will not influence the optimal
order size or the cycle length. Only the cost will increase. Therefore this is not really an extension.
When we speak of a finite supply rate s, we assume that the amount ordered is not delivered all at
once. We assume that the supplying process is continuous and takes place at a constant rate s untilQ
units are delivered to the stock and then it stops. This is only interesting if s > d.
Quantity discounts can be defined in at least two ways. First, we can think of quantity discounts
for all units purchased. If we ordered a certain amount of goods then all units will have the same
purchasing cost. Second, we can think of increasing quantity discounts. For example, the first 100
goods ordered have a unit price of 20 dollars, the next 100 a unit price of 15, and so on.
In case of non-deterministic demand we may think of D being the stochastic demand for the
firm. The games arising from these inventory situations may fall within the class of inventory
centralization games (see e.g. HARTMAN, DROR and SHAKED (1999)) where expected values are
considered. Otherwise they may fall within the class of cooperative TU games with stochastic payoffs
as considered in e.g. SUIJS, BORM, DE WAEGENAERE and TIJS (1999).
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